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Introduction
It has become abundantly clear in the first six years of the
AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) epidemic that
there will be no simple answer to this health crisis. The
obstacles to establishing eifective public health policies are
considerable. AIDS is a new disease with a unique set of
public health problems. The medical, social, and political
aspects of the disease present American society and the
world community with an awesome task.
The United States has relatively little recent experience
dealing with health crises. Since the introduction of antibi-
otics during World War II, health priorities shifted to chronic,
systemic diseases. We had come to believe that the problem
of infectious, epidemic disease had passed—a topic of con-
cern only to the developing world and historians.
In this respect, it is not surprising that in these first years
of the epidemic there has been a desire to look for historical
models as a means of dealing with the AIDS epidemic. Many
have pointed to past and contemporary public health ap-
proaches to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) as impor-
tant precedents for the fight against AIDS.' And indeed, there
are significant similarities between AIDS and other sexually
transmitted infections which go beyond the mere fact of
sexual transmission. Syphilis, for example, also may have
severe pathological eflFects. In the first half of the twentieth
century, it was both greatly feared and highly stigmatized. In
light of these analogues, the social history of eflForts to control
syphilis and other STDs may serve to inform our assessments
of the current epidemic.
But history holds no simple truths. AIDS is not syphilis;
our responses to the current epidemic will be shaped by
contemporary science, politics, and culture. Yet the history
of disease does oflFer an important set of perspectives on
current proposals and strategies. Moreover, history points to
the range of variables that will need to be addressed if we are
to create eflFective and just policies.
In these early years of the AIDS epidemic, there has
been a tendency to use analogy as a means of devising policy.
It makes sense to draw upon past policies and institutional
arrangements to address the problems posed by the current
crisis. But we need to be sophisticated in drawing analogues;
to recognize not only how AIDS is like past epidemics, but
the precise ways in which it is diflFerent. This article draws
four "lessons" from the social history of sexually transmitted
disease in the United States and assesses their relevance for
the current epidemic.
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Lesson #/—Fear of disease will powerfully influence
medical approaches and public health policy
The last years of the nineteenth century and first of the
twentieth witnessed considerable fear of sexually transmitted
infection, not unlike that which we are experiencing today. A
series of important discoveries about the pathology of syph-
ilis and gonorrhea had revealed a range of alarming patho-
logical consequences from debility, insanity, and paralysis,
to sterility and blindness. In this age of antibiotics, it is easy
to forget the fear and dread that syphilis invoked in the past.
Among the reasons that syphilis was so greatly feared
was the assumption that it could be casually transmitted.
Doctors at the turn of the twentieth century catalogued the
various modes of transmission: pens, pencils, toothbrushes,
towels and bedding, and medical procedures were all iden-
tified as potential means of communication.^ As one woman
explained in an anonymous essay in 1912:
At first it was unbelievable. I knew of the disease only through
newspaper advertisements [for patent medicines]. I had un-
derstood that it was the result of sin and that it originated and
was contracted only in the underworld of the city. I felt sure
that my friend was mistaken in diagnosis when he exclaimed,
"Another tragedy of the public drinking cup!" I eagerly met
his remark with the assurance that I did not use public drinking
cups, that I had used my own cup for years. He led me to
review my summer. After recalling a number of times when
my thirst had forced me to go to the public fountain, I came
at last to realize that what he had told me was true.'
The doctor, of course, had diagnosed syphilis. One
indication of how seriously these casual modes of transmis-
sion were taken is the fact that the US Navy removed
doorknobs from its battleships during World War I, claiming
that they had become a source of infection for many of its
sailors. We now know, of course, that syphilis cannot be
contracted in these ways. This poses a diflficult historical
problem: Why did physicians believe that they could be?
Theories of casual transmission reflected deep cultural
fears about disease and sexuality in the early twentieth
century. In these approaches to venereal disease, concems
about hygiene, contamination, and contagion were ex-
pressed, anxieties that reflected a great deal about the
contemporary society and culture. Venereal disease was
viewed as a threat to the entire late Victorian social and
sexual system, which placed great value on discipline,
restraint, and homogeneity. The sexual code of that era held
that sex would receive social sanction only in marriage. But
the concerns about venereal disease and casual transmission
also reflected a pervasive fear of the urban masses, the
growth of the cities, and the changing nature of familial
relationships.''
Today, persistent fears about casual transmission of
AIDS reflect a somewhat diflFerent, yet no less significant,
social configuration. First, AIDS is strongly associated with
behaviors which have been traditionally considered deviant.
This is true for both homosexuality and intravenous drug use.
After a generation of growing social tolerance for homosex-
uality, the epidemic has generated new fears and heightened
old hostilities. Just as syphilis created a disease-oriented
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xenophobia in the early twentieth century, AIDS has today
generated a new homophobia. AIDS has recast anxiety about
contamination in a new light. Among certain social critics,
AIDS is seen as "proof of a certain moral order.
Second, fears are fanned because we live in an era in
which the authority of scientific expertise has eroded. This
may well be an aspect of a broader decline in the legitimacy
of social institutions, but it is clearly seen in the areas of
science and medicine. Despite significant evidence that HIV
(human immunodeficiency virus) is not casually transmitted,
medical and public health experts have been unable to
provide the categorical reassurances that the public would
like. But without such guarantees, public fear has remained
high. In part, this refiects a misunderstanding of the nature of
science and its inherent uncertainty. While physicians and
public health officials have experience tolerating such uncer-
tainty, the public requires better education in order to
effectively evaluate risks.''*
Third, as a culture, we Americans are relatively unso-
phisticated in our assessments of relative risk. How are we to
evaluate the risks of AIDS? How shall social policy be
constructed around what are small or unknown risks? The
ostracism of HIV-infected children from their schools in
certain locales, the refusal of some physicians to treat AIDS
patients, job and housing discrimination against those infect-
ed (and those suspected of being infected) all reveal the
pervasive fears surrounding the epidemic. Clearly, then, one
public health goal must be to address these fears. Addressing
such fears means understanding their etiology. They origi-
nate in the particular social meaning of AIDS—its "social
construction." We will not be able to eifectively mitigate
these concerns until we understand their deeper meaning.
The response to AIDS will be fundamentally shaped by these
fears; therefore, we need to develop techniques to assist
individuals to distinguish irrational fears of AIDS from
realistic and legitimate concerns. In this respect, many have
focused on the need for more education.
Lesson #2—Education will not control the AIDS epidemic
Early in the twentieth century, physicians, public health
officials, and social reformers concerned about the problem
of syphilis and gonorrhea called for a major educational
campaign.' They cogently argued that the tide of infection
could not be stemmed until the public had adequate knowl-
edge about these diseases, their mode of transmission, and
the means of prevention. They called for an end to "the
conspiracy of silence"—the Victorian code of sexual eth-
ics—that considered all discussion of sexuality and disease in
respectable society inappropriate. Physicians had contribut-
ed to this state of affairs by hiding diagnoses from their
patients and families, and upholding what came to be known
as the "medical secret." One physician described the nature
of the conventions surrounding sexually transmitted dis-
eases:
Medical men are walking with eyes wide open along the edge
of despair so treacherous and so pitiless that the wonder can
only be that they have failed to warn the world away. Not a
signboard! Not a caution spoken above a whisper! All mystery
and seclusion .... As a result of this studied propriety, a
world more full of venereal infection than any other pesti-
lence.*
Prince Morrow, the leader of the social hygiene movement,
the antivenereal disease campaign, concluded, "Social sen-
timent holds that it is a greater violation of the properties of
life publicly to mention venereal disease than privately to
contract it."'
During this period, the press remained reticent on the
subject of sexually transmitted infections, refusing to print
accounts of their effects. Reporters employed euphemisms
such as "rare blood disorder," when forced to include a
reference to a venereal infection. Nevertheless, magazines
and newspapers did accept advertisements for venereal
nostrums and quacks. In 1912, the US Post Office confiscated
copies of birth control advocate Margaret Sanger's What
Every Girl Should Know, because it considered the refer-
ences to syphilis and gonorrhea "obscene" under the pro-
visions of the Comstock law."*
Enlightened physiciahs vigorously called for an end to
this hypocrisy. "We are dealing with the solution of a
problem," explained Dr. Egbert Grandin, "where ignorance
is not bliss but is misfortune, and where, therefore, it is folly
not to be wise.""* Social reformers viewed education and
publicity as a panacea; forthright education would end the
problem of sexually transmitted infection. If parents failed to
perform their social responsibilities and inform their children,
then the schools should include sex education. By 1919, the
US Public Health Service endorsed sex education in the
schools, noting, "As in many instances the school must take
up the burden neglected by others."" By 1922, almost half of
all secondary schools offered some instruction in sex hy-
giene.
Educational programs devised by the social hygienists
emphasized fear of infection. Prince Morrow, for example,
called fear "the protective genius of the human body."
Another physician explained, "The sexual instinct is imper-
ative and will only listen to fear." Margaret Cleaves, a
leading social hygienist, argued, "There should be taught
such disgust and dread of these conditions that naught would
induce the seeking of a polluted source for the sake of
gratifying a controllable desire."'^
In this sense, educational efforts may have actually
contributed to the pervasive fears of infection, to the stigma
associated with the diseases, and to the discrimination
against its victims. Indeed, educational materials produced
throughout the first decades of the twentieth century empha-
sized the inherent dangers of all sexual activity, especially
disease and unwanted pregnancy. In this respect, such
educational programs, rather than being termed sex educa-
tion were actually anti-sex education. Pamphlets and films
repeatedly emphasized the "loathesome" and disfiguring
aspects of sexually transmitted disease; the most drastic
pathological consequences (insanity, paralysis, blindness,
and death); as well as the disastrous impact on personal
relations.
This orientation toward sex education reached its apogee
during World War I, when American soldiers were told, "A
German bullet is cleaner than a whore." Despite their
threatening quality, these educational programs did not have
the desired efFect of reducing the rates of infection. And
indeed, sexual mores in the twentieth century have respond-
ed to a number of social and cultural forces more powerful
than the fear of disease.
There are, nonetheless, some precedents for successful
educational campaigns. During World War II, the military
initiated a massive educational campaign against sexually
transmitted disease. But unlike prior efforts, it reminded
soldiers that disease could be prevented through the use of
condoms, which were widely distributed. The military pro-
gram recognized that sexual behaviors could be modified, but
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that calls for outright abstinence were likely to fail. Given the
need for an efficient and healthy army, officials maintained a
pragmatic posture that separated morals from the essential
task of prevention. As one medical officer explained, "It is
difficult to make the sex act unpopular."''
Today, calls for better education are frequently offered
as the best hope for controlling the AIDS epidemic. But this
will only be true if some resolution is reached concerning the
specific content and nature of such educational efforts. The
limited effectiveness of education which merely encourages
fear is well-documented. Moreover, AIDS education re-
quires a forthright confrontation of aspects of human sexu-
ality that are typically avoided. To be effective, AIDS
education must be explicit, focused, and appropriately tar-
geted to a range of at-risk social groups. As the history of
sexually transmitted diseases makes clear, we need to study
the nature of behavior and disease. If education is to have a
positive impact, we need to be far more sophisticated,
creative, and bold in devising and implementing programs.
Education is not a panacea for the AIDS epidemic, just
as education did not solve the problem of other sexually
transmitted diseases earlier in the twentieth century. It is one
critical aspect of a fully articulated program. As this historical
vignette makes clear, we need to be far more explicit about
what we mean when we say "education". Certainly educa-
tion about AIDS is an important element of any public health
approach to the crisis, but we need to substantively evaluate
a range of educational programs and their impact on behavior
for populations with a variety of needs.
Because the impact of education is unclear and the
dangers of the epidemic are perceived as great (see lesson
#1), there has been considerable interest in compulsory
public health measures as a primary means of controlling
AIDS.
Lesson #i—Compulsory public health measures will not
control the epidemic
Given the considerable fear that the epidemic has gen-
erated and its obvious dangers, demands have been voiced
for the implementation of compulsory public health interven-
tions. The history of efforts to control syphilis during the
twentieth century indicates the limits of compulsory mea-
sures which range from required premarital testing to quar-
antine of infected individuals.
Next to programs for compulsory vaccination, compul-
sory programs for premarital syphilis serologies are probably
the most widely known of all compulsory public health
measures in the twentieth century United States. The devel-
opment of effective laboratory diagnostic measures stands as
a signal contribution in the history of the control of sexually
transmitted diseases. With the development of the Was-
sermann test in 1906, there was a generally reliable way of
detecting the presence of syphilis. The achievement of such
a test offered a new series of public health potentials. No
longer would diagnosis depend on strictly clinical criteria.
Diagnosis among the asymptomatic was now possible, as was
the ability to test the effectiveness of treatments. The
availability of the test led to the development of programs for
compulsory testing.
Significantly, calls for compulsory screening for syphilis
predated the Wassermann exam. Beginning in the last years
of the nineteenth century, several states began to mandate
premarital medical examinations to assure that sexually
transmitted infections were not communicated in marriage.
But without a definitive test, such examinations were of
limited use. With a laboratory test, however, calls were
voiced for requiring premarital blood tests. In 1935, Con-
necticut became the first state to mandate premarital serolo-
gies of all prospective brides and grooms. The rationale for
premarital screening was clear. If every individual about to
be married were tested, and, if found to be infected, treated,
the transmission of infection to marital partners and offspring
would be halted. The legislation was vigorously supported by
the public health establishment, organized women's groups,
magazines, and the news media. Many clinicians, however,
argued against the legislation, suggesting that diagnosis
should not rely exclusively on laboratory findings which
were, in some instances, incorrect. N.A. Nelson of the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health explained, "To-
day, it is becoming the fashion to support, by law, the too
common notion that the laboratory is infallible."''* Despite
such objections, by the end of the World War II, virtually all
the states had enacted provisions mandating premarital
serologies.
Legislation is currently pending in 35 state legislatures
that would require premarital HIV serologies. The rationale
for such programs is often the historical precedent of syphilis
screening. The logic seems intuitively correct: We screen for
syphilis. AIDS is a far more serious disease, we should
therefore screen for AIDS. In this respect it is worth
reviewing the effectiveness of premarital syphilis screening
as well as those factors that distinguish syphilis from AIDS.
Mandatory premarital serologies never proved to be a
particularly effective mechanism for finding new cases of
syphilis. First, physicians and public health officials recog-
nized that there was a significant rate of false positive tests
which occurred because of technical inadequacies of the tests
themselves or as a result of biological phenomena (such as
other infections). As the concepts of sensitivity (the test's
performance among those with the disease) and specificity
(the test's performance among those free of infections) came
to be more fully understood in the 1930s, the oversensitivity
of tests like the Wassermann was revealed. As many as 25 per
cent of individuals determined to be infected with syphilis by
the Wassermann test were actually free of infection; never-
theless, these individuals often underwent toxic treatment
with arsenical drugs, assuming the tests were correct. Be-
yond this, individuals with false positive tests often suffered
the social repercussions of being infected: deep stigma and
disrupted relationships. As many physicians pointed out, a
positive serology did not always mean that an individual
could transmit the disease. Because the tests tended to be
mandated for a population at relatively low risk of infection,
their accuracy was further compromised. Some individuals
reportedly avoided the test altogether.''
Many of the difficulties associated with the high numbers
of false positives were alleviated as new, more specific tests
were developed in the 1940s and 1950s, but the central
problem remained. Premarital syphilis serologies failed to
identify a significant percentage of the infected population. In
1978, for example, premarital screening accounted for only
1.27 per cent of all national tests found to be positive for
syphilis. The costs of these programs were estimated at $80
million annually.'* Another study in California projected the
costs per case found through premarital screening to be
$240,000.'^ Moreover, premarital screening for syphilis con-
tinued to find a significant number of false positives. As these
studies indicated, the benefits of screening programs are
dependent on the prevalence of the disease in the population
being screened. In this respect, it seems unlikely that pre-
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marital screening effectively served the function of prevent-
ing infections within marriage that its advocates assumed it
would. These data led a number of states to repeal mandatory
premarital serologies in the early 1980s.
Compulsory premarital syphilis serologies thus offer a
dubious precedent for required HIV screening. The point, of
course, is not that the test is inaccurate. ELISA (enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay) testing coupled with the West-
ern Blot can be quite reliable, but only when applied to
populations which are likely to have been infected. Screening
of low-prevalence populations, like premarital couples, is
unlikely to have any significant impact on the course of the
epidemic. Not only will such programs find relatively few
new cases, they will also reveal large numbers of false
positives. A recent study concluded that a national manda-
tory premarital screening program would find approximately
1,200 new cases of HIV infection, one-tenth of 1 per cent of
those currently infected. But it would also incorrectly iden-
tify as many as 380 individuals—actually free of infection—
as infected, even with supplementary Westem blot tests.
Such a program would also falsely reassure as many as 120
individuals with false negative results.'* Moreover, the in-
ability to treat and render non-infectious those individuals
who are found to be infected severely limits the potential
benefits of such mandatory measures. With syphilis serolo-
gies, the rationale of the program was to treat infected
individuals.
This, of course, is not to argue that testing has no role in
an effective AIDS public health campaign. During the late
1930s, a massive voluntary testing campaign heightened
consciousness of syphilis in Chicago, bringing thousands of
new cases into treatment. AIDS testing, conducted volun-
tarily and confidentially, targeted to individuals who have
specific risk factors for infection, may have significant public
health benefits. Compulsory screening, however, could
merely discourage infected individuals from being tested.
This makes clear the need to enact legislation guaranteeing
the confidentiality of those who volunteer to be tested and
prohibiting discrimination against HIV-infected individuals.
As a mandatory measure, premarital screening is a
relatively modest proposal. During the course of the twen-
tieth century, more radical and intrusive compulsory mea-
sures to control STDs, such as quarantine, have also been
attempted. These, too, have failed. During World War I, as
hysteria about the impact of STDs rose. Congress passed
legislation to support the quarantine of prostitutes suspected
of spreading disease. The Act held that anyone suspected of
harboring a venereal infection could be detained and incar-
cerated until determined to be non-infectious. During the
course of the War, more than 20,000 women were held in
camps because they were suspected on being "spreaders" of
venereal disease.
The program had no apparent impact on rates of infec-
tion, which actually climbed substantially during the War. In
sexually transmitted infections, the reservoir of infection is
relatively high, modes of transmission are specific, and
infected individuals may be healthy. In the case of AIDS,
where there is no medical intervention to render individuals
non-infectious, quarantine is totally impractical because it
would require life-long incarceration of the infected.
Compulsory measures often generate critics because
such policies may infringe on basic civil liberties. From an
ethical and legal viewpoint, the first question that must be
asked about any potential policy intervention is: Is it likely to
work? Only if there is clear evidence to suggest the program
would be effective does it make sense to evaluate the civil
liberties implications. Then it is possible to evaluate the
constitutional question: Is the public health benefit to be
derived worthy of the possible costs in civil liberties? Is the
proposed compulsory program the least restrictive of the
range of potential measures available to achieve the public
good?"
In this respect, it is worth noting that compulsory
measures may actually be counterproductive. First, they
require substantial resources that could be more effectively
allocated. Second, they have often had the effect of driving
the very individuals that the program hopes to reach farther
away from public health institutions. Ineffective draconian
measures would serve only to augment the AIDS crisis.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that such programs offer no
benefits, they may have substantial political and cultural
appeal (see lesson #1).
Because compulsory measures are controversial and
unlikely to control the epidemic, there is considerable hope
that we will soon have a "magic bullet"—a biomedical "fix"
to free us of the hazards of AIDS.
Lesson #4—The development of effective treatments and
vaccines will not immediately or easily end the AJDS
epidemic.
As the history of efforts to control other sexually
transmitted diseases makes clear, effective treatment has not
always led to control. In 1909, German Nobel laureate Paul
Ehrlich discovered Salvarsan (arsphenamine), an arsenic
compound which killed the spirochete, the organism which
causes syphilis. Salvarsan was the first effective chemother-
apeutic agent for a specific disease. Ehrlich called Salvarsan
a "magic bullet," a drug which would seek out and destroy
its mark.-^" He claimed that modern medicine would seek the
discovery of a series of such drugs to eliminate the micro-
organisms which cause disease. Although Salvarsan was an
effective treatment, it was toxic and difficult to administer.
Patients required a painful regimen of injections, sometimes
for as long as two years.
Unlike the arsphenamines, penicillin was truly a wonder
drug. In early 1943, Dr. John S. Mahoney of the US Public
Health Service found that penicillin was effective in treating
rabbits infected with syphilis. After repeating his experi-
ments with human subjects, his findings were announced and
the massive production of penicillin began.^'
With a single shot, the scourge of syphilis could be
avoided. Incidence fell from a high of 72 cases per 100,000 in
1943 to about 4 per 100,000 in 1956.2^ In 1949, Mahoney
wrote, "as a result of antibiotic therapy, gonorrhea has
almost passed from the scene as an important clinical and
public entity.^' An article in the American Journal of Syphilis
in 1951 asked, "Are Venereal Diseases Disappearing?"
Although the article concluded that it was too soon to know,
by 1955 the Journal itself had disappeared. The Journal of
Social Hygiene, for half a century the leading publication on
social dimensions of the problem, also ceased publication. As
rates reached all time lows, it appeared that venereal diseases
would join the ranks of other infectious diseases that had
come under the control of modem medicine.
Although there is no question that the nature and
meaning of syphilis and gonorrhea underwent a fundamental
change with the introduction of antibiotic therapy, the decline
of venereal diseases proved short-lived. Rates of infection
began to climb in the early 1960s. By the late 1950s much of
the machinery, especially procedures for public education.
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case-finding, tracing and diagnosis had been severely re-
duced.'
In 1987, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported
an increase in cases of primary and secondary syphilis. The
estimated annual rate per 100,000 population rose from 10.9
to 13.3 cases, the largest increases in 10 years. These figures
are particularly striking in that they come in the midst of the
AIDS epidemic which many have assumed has led to a
substantial decline in sexual encounters. Moreover, after an
eight-year decline, rates of congenital syphilis have also
reportedly risen since 1983. The CDC concluded that indi-
viduals with a history of sexually transmitted infection are at
increased risk for infection with the AIDS virus.^''
Despite the eflFectiveness of penicillin as a cure for
syphilis, the disease has persisted. The issue, therefore, is not
merely the development of eflFective treatments but the
process by which they are deployed; the means by which they
move from laboratory to full allocation to those afFected.
EflFective treatments without adequate education, counsel-
ing, and funding may not reach those who most need them.
Even "magic bullets" need to be eflFectively delivered.
Obviously eflFective treatments should be a priority in a
multifaceted approach to AIDS and will ultimately be an
important component in its control; but even a magic bullet
will not quickly or completely solve the problem.
No doubt, new and more eflFective treatments for AIDS
will be developed in the years ahead, but their deployment
will raise a series of complex issues ranging from human
subject research to actual allocation. And while eflFective
treatments may help to control further infection, as they do
for syphilis and gonorrhea, treatments which prolong the life
of AIDS patients may have little or no impact on the rates of
transmission of the virus, which occurs principally among
individuals who have no symptoms of disease.
This suggests certain fundamental flaws in the biomed-
ical model of disease. Diseases are complex bio-ecological
problems that may be mitigated only by addressing a range of
scientific, social, and political considerations. No single
intervention—even an eflFective vaccine—will adequately
address the complexities of the AIDS epidemic.
Conclusions
As these historical lessons make clear, in the context of
fear surrounding the epidemic (lesson #1), the principal
proposals for eradicating AIDS (lessons #2-4) are unlikely to
be eflFective, at least in the immediate future. These lessons
should not imply, however, that nothing will work; they make
evident that no single avenue is likely to lead to success.
Moreover, they suggest that in considering any intervention
we will require sophisticated research to understand its
potential impact on the epidemic. While education, testing,
and biomedical research all oflFer some hope, in each instance
we will need to fully consider their particular eflFectiveness as
measures to control disease.
Simple answers based upon historical precedents are
unlikely to alleviate the AIDS crisis. History does, however,
point to a range of variables which infiuence disease, and
those factors which require attention if it is to be eflFectively
addressed. Any successful approach to the epidemic will
require a full recognition of the important social, cultural, and
biological aspects of AIDS. A public health priority will be to
lead in the process of discerning those programs likely to
have a beneficial impact from those with considerable polit-
ical and cultural appeal, but unlikely to positively aflFect the
course of the epidemic. Only in this way we will be able to
devise eflFective and humane public policies.
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